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 Non-technical Summary 
As innovation is acknowledged to be a key driver of economic growth, governments 
promote innovation activities both in the public and in the private sector. There are different 
instruments available to stimulate innovation activities of the private sector. Public 
procurement has been at the centre of recent discussions on innovation policy on both 
European and national levels (e.g., Aho-Report, Barcelona Strategy). This might have a large 
potential to stimulate innovation since it accounts for 16% of combined EU-15 GDP. In 
Germany, public procurement spending is around 260 billion Euros a year and thus takes up 
about 12% of GDP.  
In this study, we conceptually explore the specific features of public procurement as an 
instrument of innovation policy and embed public procurement into the broader context of 
stimulating innovation in enterprises by public policy. More precisely, we identify shared and 
distinctive features of public procurement compared to other major policy instruments, i.e. co-
public funding for private innovation projects, knowledge spillovers from publicly funded 
universities as well as intervention through regulation. 
Empirically, we translate this analytical framework into a comparative assessment of how 
public procurement performs relative to these other policy options. We measure performance 
in terms of the market success of firms’ innovations. Moreover, we question whether these 
effects apply uniformly to all firms, independent of their size or the industry and region they 
are operating in. Instead, we suggest that firms are heterogeneous with regard to whether 
certain policy instruments are relevant, accessible or useful to them. As a result, distinct 
subpopulations of firms can be identified that respond differently to various combinations of 
policy instruments. Our empirical investigation rests upon a survey of more than 1,100 
innovative firms in Germany. Our survey puts us in the position to trace all sources of 
valuable innovation impulses, namely public customers, law and regulations, universities and 
public funding for R&D. We relate these sources back to innovation success. 
We find that public policy leverage points are limited neither to the supply nor the demand 
side. Public procurement has significant positive effects on innovation success but so does the 
provision of a knowledge infrastructure in universities spilling over to firms. Both effects 
have similar impacts on innovation success. Interestingly, the positive effects of public 
procurement stem from general administrative procurement and not from defense related 
public procurement. In a second step, we explore whether these effects vary across firms. The 
benefits of university knowledge apply uniformly to all firms. However, public procurement 
is especially effective for smaller firms in regions under economic stress as well as in 
distributive and technological services. Based on these findings targeted policy 
recommendations are developed. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Innovative Produkte und Dienstleistungen sind weitgehend als Grundlage des 
wirtschaftlichen Wachstums akzeptiert. Staatliche Stellen unterstützen deshalb 
Innovationsaktivitäten im privaten Sektor mit einer Reihe von Maßnahmen. Besonderes 
Augenmerk hat dabei in jüngster Vergangenheit die Rolle staatlicher 
Beschaffungsmaßnahmen mit Blick auf deren Innovationseffekte erhalten. Diese Diskussion 
wird gegenwärtig sowohl auf nationaler wie auf Europäischer Ebene geführt (z.B. Aho-
Bericht, Barcelona-Strategie). Die potenziellen Auswirkungen von gezielt eingesetzten 
staatlichen Beschaffungsmaßnahmen sind angesichts der Größenordnung des 
Beschaffungsbudgets erheblich (260 Mrd. € oder 12% des BIP jährlich in Deutschland und 
sogar 16% des BIP von EU-15). 
Im Zentrum der vorliegenden Analyse steht die konzeptionelle Integration des 
Innovationsinstruments öffentliche Beschaffung in den breiteren Kontext der 
Forschungsförderung. Dabei werden insbesondere Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede 
zwischen öffentlichen Beschaffungsmaßnahmen und anderen dominanten Formen der 
Forschungsförderung mit Blick auf ihre Innovationswirkung untersucht. Diese 
Vergleichsinstrumente setzen sich zusammen aus finanzieller Förderung privater 
Innovationsprojekte durch den Staat, Wissenstransfers von Universitäten und regulatorischen 
Eingriffen. 
An diese konzeptionelle Diskussion schließt sich der empirische Test mittels einer 
komparativen Studie zur Wirkung der einzelnen Politikoptionen auf den Innovationserfolg an. 
Gemessen ist der Innovationserfolg dabei als der erzielte Umsatz mit neuen Produkten. Die 
empirische Studie untersucht basierend auf Umfrageinformationen von mehr als 1,100 
Unternehmen in Deutschland die Effekte aller vier Politikoptionen (öffentliche Beschaffung, 
finanzielle Förderung, Wissenstransfer aus Universitäten und Regulierung). Die Studie 
hinterfragt dabei zusätzlich, ob diese Effekte für alle Unternehmen im selben Maße auftreten 
oder auf Unternehmen mit einer bestimmten Größe oder aus bestimmten Branchen und 
Regionen begrenzt bleiben. 
Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass sowohl öffentliche Beschaffungsmaßnahmen als auch der 
Wissenstransfer aus Universitäten signifikant positiv zum Innovationserfolg beitragen. 
Interessanterweise stammt der Effekt öffentlicher Beschaffung aus dem generellen 
Beschaffungsbedarf (z.B. Verwaltung) und nicht aus dem Bereich Verteidigung und 
öffentliche Sicherheit. Die differenziertere Analyse legt dabei offen, dass Wissenstransfers 
aus Universitäten für alle Unternehmen gleichermaßen positiv auf den Innovationserfolg 
wirken. Der Effekt von öffentlichen Beschaffungsmaßnahmen ist demgegenüber insbesondere 
spürbar bei kleinen Unternehmen aus dem distributiven und technologischen 
Dienstleistungsbereich in ökonomisch belasteten Regionen. Auf dieser Basis können gezielt 
Politikempfehlungen abgeleitet werden. 
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Abstract 
Public procurement has been at the centre of recent discussions on 
innovation policy on both European and national levels (e.g., Aho-Report, 
Barcelona Strategy). It has a large potential to stimulate innovation since it 
accounts for 16% of combined EU-15 GDP. We embed public procurement 
for innovation into the broader framework of public policies to stimulate 
innovation: regulations, R&D subsidies and knowledge infrastructure (i.e. 
basic research at universities). We synthesize the characteristics of all four 
instruments based on existing literature and quantitatively compare their 
effects on innovation success. Our empirical investigation rests upon a 
survey of more than 1,100 innovative firms in Germany. Our survey puts us 
in the position to trace all sources of valuable innovation impulses, namely 
public customers, law and regulations, universities and public funding for 
R&D. We relate these sources back to innovation success. We find that 
(non-defense related) public procurement and knowledge spillovers from 
universities propel innovation success equally. In a second step, we explore 
whether these effects vary across firms (e.g. size, location, industry). The 
benefits of university knowledge apply uniformly to all firms. However, 
public procurement is especially effective for smaller firms in regions under 
economic stress as well as in distributive and technological services. Based 
on these findings targeted policy recommendations can be developed. 
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1 Introduction 
As innovation is acknowledged to be a key driver of economic growth, governments 
promote innovation activities both in the public and in the private sector. The promotion of 
R&D is also an essential element of the Lisbon strategy launched in 2000 and further defined 
by the Barcelona Research Council in 2002. The objective is to increase investment in R&D 
to 3% of GDP by 2010 – two-thirds of this increase should be funded by the private sector – 
so that Europe becomes the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world. There are different instruments available to stimulate innovation activities of the 
private sector. Public procurement has been revitalized as an innovation policy instrument on 
both European and national levels. In recent years major initiatives have been launched to 
foster innovation through public procurement e.g., the Aho-Report (European Commission, 
2006); Barcelona Strategy (European Commission, 2003). Public procurement might have a 
large potential since it accounts for 16% of combined EU-15 GDP (Georghiou et al., 2003). In 
Germany, public procurement spending is around 260 billion Euros a year and thus takes up 
about 12% of GDP (BMBF, 2006).  
Public procurement is only one of many innovation policy instruments. Regulations, R&D 
subsidies and the scientific and technological infrastructure have also been identified as other 
main types of public innovation policy which are designed to improve industrial 
innovativeness (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1981; Geroski, 1990). In this study, we explore the 
specific features of public procurement in innovation policy conceptually and embed public 
procurement into the broader context of stimulating innovation in enterprises by public policy. 
More precisely, we identify shared and distinctive features of public procurement compared to 
other major policy instruments, i.e. co-public funding for private innovation projects, 
knowledge spillovers from publicly funded universities as well as intervention through 
regulation. Empirically, we translate this analytical framework into a comparative assessment 
of how public procurement performs relative to these other policy options. We measure 
performance in terms of the market success of firms’ innovations. Moreover, we question 
whether these effects apply uniformly to all firms, independent of their size or the industry 
and region they are operating in. Instead, we suggest that firms are heterogeneous with 
regards to whether certain policy instruments are relevant, accessible or useful to them. As a 
result, distinct subpopulations of firms can be identified that respond differently to various 
combinations of policy instruments. Based on these findings, tailor-made policy mixes can be 
developed to optimize effectiveness. In essence, we ask: Is public procurement an effective 
instrument to provide public support for innovation compared to other options and if so, for 
which firms does it work? We explore these research questions empirically for a broad sample 
of more than 1,100 firms and their innovation activities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
public procurement in innovation policy. Section 3 relates it to other important policy 
instruments and presents previous empirical results. The database and the estimation strategy 
for the empirical study are described in section 4. Section 5 presents its results. Finally, we 
draw conclusions in section 6. 
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2 The role of public procurement in innovation policy 
Public procurement has received much attention in recent discussions on favorable 
innovation policy options, both at the European level, such as in the Barcelona Strategy 
(European Commission, 2003) and the Aho-Report (European Commission, 2006), and at the  
national level. In Germany, for example, public demand for innovative products will be 
extended as part of the federal government’s Hightech-Strategy. Examples are intelligent 
energy concepts for city halls or schools and the equipment of public service cars with novel 
types of engine/propulsion technologies (BMBF, 2007). 
With regards to innovation, public procurement can be divided into two types: the purchase 
of standard products like paper or paperclips, i.e. involving no innovation, and public 
technology procurement, i.e. the purchase of new technologies and innovative products and 
services. The latter category is referred to if a government announces its intention to foster 
public procurement as an innovation policy instrument.1 Public technology procurement is a 
demand-side instrument and can be defined as the purchase “of a not-yet-existing product or 
system whose design and production will require further, if not completely novel, 
technological development work” (Edquist and Hommen, 2000: 5). Ideally, the functional 
requirements of the demanded product are predefined by the government, but the realization 
and design are not (see Rothwell and Zegveld, 1981; Geroski, 1990; Edler and Georghiou, 
2007). Then, public procurement might be a suitable tool for stimulating the generation and 
diffusion of technological innovation (Geroski, 1990). The two principal reasons for the use 
of this policy tool are to satisfy and improve the supply of public services and to meet certain 
political goals by stimulating demand, e.g. in areas of sustainability or energy efficiency 
(Dalpé, 1994; TAB, 2006). After the government has placed a tender for a specific need and 
firms have applied, the decision is made by the government. Only one firm or a consortium of 
firms gets the order to generate and deliver the product or service. Thus, it is a competitive 
and selective system. A major advantage of public procurement in innovation policy is that 
government specifies a desired output and leaves it to the creativity of private businesses to 
achieve this result with the most effective and efficient technologies. 
Since the purchase of the new product by the government is contracted, the market risk for 
the developing and delivering firm is reduced, because a certain amount of sales is 
guaranteed. Often, the government is a large scale and major user of innovation and 
technologies. Thus, it can act as an early-state or lead user which bears the costs of learning 
and refining novel products. Besides, the public sector’s significant scale enables innovative 
firms to generate experience/scale cost reductions quickly. This should lead to reduced prices 
and therefore newly created or extended markets for private demand as well.2 Through the 
use of a particular innovation the government can also send positive signals to the private 
market and increase awareness, so that public procurement might also spill over to the private 
 
1  In the following, the term public procurement implies the purchase of technologies. We will use the terms 
public procurement and public technology procurement interchangeably. 
2  For the concept of lead users in innovation see Von Hippel (1986). 
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market and propel the diffusion of innovations (Rothwell, 1984; Porter, 1991; Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007). However, there is a risk that the developed product will only meet 
idiosyncratic demand so that further sales in the market will be limited. This might especially 
be the case of military demand, as stated, e.g., by Stoneman (1987), Lichtenberg (1989) or 
James (2004). In addition, the risk that the R&D project will fail
The role of public procurement in the development of new products and its success have not 
yet been well analyzed. Several case studies have been conducted; see for example for the 
USA Cohen and Noll (1991) and for European cases Edquist et al. (2000) or Edler et al. 
(2005). Examples of both success and failure are known. However, quantitative analyses of 
which firms are responsive to the stimulation of innovation via public procurement and 
benefit from the government as a customer are still rare. One aim of this study is to contribute 
to this literature by empirically investigating the role that public procurement plays for the 
innovation success of firms. 
3 A comparative perspective on public procurement in innovation 
policy 
Other forms of public support for private innovation activities have received significant 
attention in both academic and policy making discussions. They are typically divided into 
instruments providing additional inputs for private innovation processes (i.e. supply side) and 
instruments influencing innovation outputs (i.e. demand side). The former is most importantly 
associated with the public provision of resources, both tangible (e.g. funding) and intangible 
(e.g. scientific knowledge) in nature, while the latter influences markets for innovative 
products or services (e.g. through mandatory standards). Public procurement is a demand side 
instrument. We will briefly outline major features of other important innovation policy 
instruments: regulation on the demand side and knowledge spillovers from universities as 
well as R&D subsidies on the supply side. We conclude the conceptual discussion by drawing 
a synthesis of all four policy instruments under consideration with regards to shared and 
distinctive features and a review of comparative studies. 
Regulation 
Regulation is a demand side instrument. It refers to the “implementation of rules by public 
authorities and governmental bodies to influence the behaviour of private actors in the 
economy” (European Commission, 2004: 4). Regulations can be classified as economic (e.g. 
antitrust policy, price control), social (e.g. environmental or safety regulation) or 
administrative (e.g. product liability) regulations (OECD, 1997). Regulation policy can be 
considered as an indirect method of affecting innovation since it defines the framework 
conditions for a firm and no public funds are used (Geroski, 1990). However, it has a direct 
effect on firms since they have to comply with the regulations, e.g., environmental 
 
3  For a more detailed description of public procurement see, e.g. Geroski (1990) or Edler and Georghiou 
(2007). 
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regulations, quality standards. Compliance probably causes additional costs for the firm and 
delays the time to market. Regulation is a non-selective system since all companies of an 
industry are affected. A possible exception is an EU Directive, which is not implemented by 
all European countries in the same way and at the same time (Blind, 2004). 
The Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (2004) analyzes the effects of 
regulation on innovation empirically. For this purpose about 250 mostly European companies 
are surveyed. Considering the introduction of new products and services by firms, they find 
that regulations can have both positive effects – such as protection from liability claims or 
increased acceptance of new products by consumers and users – and negative impacts – such 
as increasing labour and development costs. The most important regulations for the 
introduction of new products and services relate to health and safety aspects, the quality of 
products and services and the question of liability.4 Jaffe et al. (1995) survey the empirical 
literature on the hypothetical linkages between environmental regulation and different 
measures of competitiveness. They find little evidence of either an adverse or a stimulating 
effect of environmental regulations on innovation and competitiveness. With respect to 
administrative regulation, in particular liability rules such as product safety, Viscusi and 
Moore (1993) show empirically that liability at low and moderate levels has a positive impact 
on product innovation whereas at very high levels the effect turns negative. Overall, 
regulation as a barrier for innovation activities is only a minor factor. Much more important 
barriers for innovation activities are high economic risks and high innovation costs (Rammer 
et al., 2005). 
The overall effect – and in particular the effect in comparison to other instruments – of 
regulations on innovation is not unambiguous. Regulations clearly have the potential to 
stimulate innovations. The question is to what extent this impact is visible and accounts for 
market novelties in the manufacturing and service sector. It is also worth asking to what 
extent mandatory standards eliminate opportunities for competing firms to differentiate 
themselves in competition. 
Universities and public research institutions  
Most of the literature deals with supply-side instruments used by the governments to 
increase business R&D activities. Public R&D subsidies and the provision of research 
infrastructure via universities and public research institutions are the two most important 
supply-side instruments.  
It has already been stated by Rothwell and Zegveld (1980: 50) that “Governments may 
influence the course of innovation by their support for background basic research and applied 
research within the scientific and technological ‘infrastructure’.” Support for universities and 
public research institutions does not provide direct financial assistance for the business sector. 
The government rather promotes the generation and provision of scientific and technological 
knowledge within universities or scientific institutions. Generally, more fundamental research 
 
4  For an overview of different types of regulations and their possible impact on innovation see, e.g., 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (2004). 
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is conducted, which “expands the capability of the economy to generate new inventions and 
innovations rapidly and effectively” (Geroski, 1990: 183). University research is regarded as 
an important contributor to technical progress and industrial innovation, in varying degrees to 
different industries (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Rothwell and Zegveld, 1980; Mansfield, 
1991; Pavitt, 1991). The opportunity to access this new knowledge is generally open to all 
firms. Firms can use it in order to access specialist technical support, to complement internal 
R&D – which is especially important since research has become more expensive – or it can 
provide a window on emerging technologies (Tidd et al., 1997). It is the decision of the firm 
to use this opportunity or not. However, there is also the risk that idiosyncratic knowledge 
will be generated, which cannot (yet) be used by business firms. In recent years public 
programs have been developed, e.g., the framework programs by the European Commission, 
which emphasize the support of collaboration between scientific institutions and firms 
(Caloghirou et al., 2001).  
University-industry relationships can be widely observed (Caloghirou, 2001; Perkmann and 
Walsh, 2007). A variety of interactions are used, such as joint research, contract research, 
personnel mobility and training (Schartinger et al., 2002). Several empirical studies 
investigate the impact of a firm’s collaboration with universities and research institutions; 
most show that firms profit from this type of collaboration. For example, Belderbos et al. 
(2004) and Aschhoff and Schmidt (2006) show that R&D collaboration with universities and 
research institutions increases a firm’s sales attributable to market novelties. Miotti and 
Sachwald (2003) and Lööf and Broström (2008) both confirm for manufacturing firms that 
this type of collaboration has a positive impact on a firm’s probability of applying for a 
patent. The latter study also finds an increase in a firm’s innovative sales. However, several 
studies warn that these positive effects are limited to certain, mostly high-technology 
industries and large firms with high R&D intensities and related absorptive capacities (see, 
e.g., Cohen et al., 2002; Fontana et al., 2006). 
Public R&D subsidies 
Public funding of private R&D activities is used as an innovation policy instrument by the 
governments of most OECD countries. Typically, the government selects specific R&D 
projects for which firms have applied for public support. Governments intend to select 
projects with a high social return that would not have been carried out in the absence of public 
support. Thus, not all firms benefit from R&D subsidies. Most schemes work on a cost 
sharing basis. In Europe, up to 50% of a firm’s R&D project costs are typically covered by the 
funding source. Therefore, the funding directly reduces firms’ R&D costs. However, the 
supply of public R&D subsidies for firms bears the inherent risk of crowding out company 
financed R&D expenditures, since every company is keen to reduce R&D  costs and thus may 
apply for financial support. Public subsidies can be classified as a direct instrument since they 
provide financial support for firms. In contrast to the other policy instruments, R&D subsidies 
focus on the development of new technologies, not on the diffusion of the generated 
technology.  
A lot of studies have been conducted in order to investigate the effects of R&D subsidies, in 
particular in the context of evaluations. The effects found were mixed (for an overview see, 
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e.g., David et al., 2000, or Aerts et al., 2007). However, most of the empirical studies for 
German firms certify a positive effect of subsidies on innovation input (Fier, 2002; Czarnitzki 
and Fier, 2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003). A positive effect of subsidies was also found on 
companies’ patent activities (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006).  
Another form of public financial support for private R&D could be provided in the form of 
R&D tax credits. Since our subsequent empirical analysis is limited to Germany, where the 
instrument of R&D tax credits is currently not employed, we will not explore it in more detail 
conceptually.  
Synthesis 
Overall, all four instruments have the potential to encourage and stimulate innovations. 
Table 1 summarizes the previous discussion. The number of empirical studies on effects and 
effectiveness of supply-side instruments is enormous, in particular regarding R&D subsidies. 
Astonishingly, there is only little empirical evidence on the effect of demand-side instruments 
on innovation and little has been done to compare the effects of different instruments. Hence, 
our goal is to extend the existing literature by comparing all four instruments with regards to 
their effect on market success with innovation.  
Table 1: Characteristics of the four policy instruments from a firm’s perspective 
 Public 
procurement 
Regulation Research 
institutions & 
universities 
Public R&D 
subsidies 
Input money none knowledge money 
Primary 
participation 
incentive for 
firms 
sales mandatory access to 
knowledge 
cost/risk sharing 
Selection by state none firm state 
Effect on 
success 
market risk 
reduction 
market risk 
reduction 
technological 
opportunity 
cost reduction 
Inherent risk idiosyncratic 
demand 
“egalitarianism” idiosyncratic 
knowledge 
crowding out of 
private R&D 
investments 
 
Previous research with a similar focus on investigating several instruments simultaneously 
is rather scarce and has led to mixed results. On the one hand, Rothwell and Zegveld (1981) 
find that demand is the most important means used by the government to trigger technical 
innovation; subsidies are the least important instrument. Regulation is not found to prevent 
innovation to a significant extent. The infrastructure support and universities could also 
develop some major inventions. Geroski (1990) also assesses public procurement as a greater 
stimulus for industrial innovativeness than R&D subsidies. On the other hand, Palmberg 
(2004) finds that environmental issues and regulations/standards contribute more to the origin 
of innovations than scientific breakthrough and public research programs. Public procurement 
is found to be the least important factor for the origin of innovations.  
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We suspect that these mixed results can be traced back to structural features in firm 
characteristics which influence their reactions to different policy instruments. We investigate 
two major factors:  
? Firm resources   
Firms require certain resources to participate successfully in different types of policy 
instruments. Cohen et al. (2002) and Fontana et al. (2006) show, for example, that 
firm size and age determine a firm’s probability of engaging in research 
collaboration with research institutions. Promising channels for knowledge transfers 
need to be established over time and require substantial resource commitments 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006). Younger and smaller firms may be lack these resources. 
? Geographic and industry opportunity  
A firm’s geographic location or industry may mitigate or reinforce its reaction to 
certain policy instruments. For example, Grimpe and Sofka (2008) show that firms 
in high-tech industries are more likely to engage in knowledge sourcing from 
universities. Besides, high quality research institutions may be concentrated in 
certain regions within a country. At the same time, regulations and R&D subsidy 
programs may be targeted at specific industries or regions. For example, the EU 
structural funds program sets a certain threshold for GDP per capital for European 
regions to qualify for participation. 
4 Empirical study 
4.1 Data 
For the empirical part of this analysis we use cross-section data from a survey on the 
innovation activities of German enterprises called the “Mannheim Innovation Panel” (MIP). 
The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on 
behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The methodology and 
questionnaire used by the survey, which is targeted at enterprises with at least five employees, 
are the same as those used in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), conducted every four 
years under the coordination of Eurostat. For our analysis we use the 2003 survey, in which 
data was collected on the innovation activities of enterprises during the three-year period 
2000-2002.5 Non-innovating firms are excluded from our analysis. Our empirical analysis 
rests upon 1,149 company observations from both manufacturing and service sectors, for 
which all the variables needed for our model are available. 
CIS surveys are self-reported and represent subjective assessments. This raises quality 
issues with regards to administration, non-response and response accuracy (for a recent 
discussion see Criscuolo et al., 2005). Several features of our survey helped minimize these 
 
5  The sample was drawn using the stratified random sample technique. For a more detailed description of the 
dataset and the survey see Rammer et al. (2005). 
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potential problems. First, our CIS survey was administered via mail, which means that it does 
not suffer from certain shortcomings and biases of telephone interviews (for a discussion see 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). The multinational application of CIS surveys adds extra 
layers of quality management and assurance. CIS surveys are subject to extensive pre-testing 
and piloting in various countries, industries and firms with regards to interpretability, 
reliability and validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006). Second, a comprehensive non-response 
analysis of more than 4,000 firms showed no systematic differences between responding and 
non-responding firms with respect to their innovation activities. Third, the questionnaire 
contains detailed definitions and examples to increase response accuracy. Longhand questions 
(e.g. “Please describe your most important product innovation briefly”) allow robustness 
checks for multiple choice answers.  
In conclusion, the major advantages of CIS surveys are that they provide direct, importance-
weighted measures for a comprehensive set of issues (Criscuolo et al., 2005). This 
information is self-reported. Heads of R&D departments or innovation management are asked 
directly if and how they are able to generate innovations. This immediate information on 
processes and outputs can complement traditional measures of innovation such as patents 
(Kaiser, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
4.2 Variables 
Dependent variable 
Researchers have discussed several concepts for measuring innovation success (for an 
overview see OECD, 2005). They range from innovation inputs (R&D expenditures) to the 
outputs of innovation activities, e.g. patents, new processes and products. We choose the latter 
approach. While each new product may be valuable in itself, the success of the firm that 
produces it depends heavily on its market acceptance. Hence, we conceptualise innovation 
success as the share of turnover achieved with new products. Besides, new products have 
varying degrees of novelty, i.e. whether they are just new to the firm, or to the market as a 
whole. The former may be more related to imitative behaviour whereas the latter is more 
closely related to radical innovation success. We opt for the share of turnover with market 
novelties6 as our dependent variable, in line with several other studies in the field (see for 
example Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
Focus variables 
Our survey provides us with the unique opportunity to capture all policy instruments 
described in the theoretical part. We generate the key variable of our investigation, public 
procurement, based on an open question asking which industry the customers that triggered 
innovation belonged to.7 We consider public procurement as an important source of 
 
6  By definition this is a novelty in a firm’s relevant market and not necessarily a “new to the world” 
innovation. 
7  The question is part of a section that initially defines external sources for innovation as impulses that were 
indispensable for the firm’s new products, services or processes. The exact question is: “Have you 
introduced significantly improved products or processes between 2000 and 2002 because specific customers 
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innovation for a firm if the respondents indicate that the customers came from public 
administration, defense or compulsory social security (NACE 75.1, 75.2 and 75.3) and 
construct a corresponding dummy variable. As a consistency check we split up this variable 
into defense (75.2) and non-defense public procurement and estimate a separate model for 
each. A separate question asks for laws and regulations that were essential impulses for 
innovation in the firm. We add a dummy variable indicating whether this was the case. We 
capture innovation impulses from universities in the same way, i.e. through a separate 
dedicated question and the generation of a corresponding dummy variable. Thereby, 
universities also include public R&D laboratories, non-university research institutions etc. 
Finally, we are able to utilize a separate, direct question on whether the firm received public 
funding for an innovation project and add another dummy variable. 
Control variables 
We add several control variables to our model to control for other factors influencing a 
firm’s success with market novelties. Most importantly, we control for the firm’s own R&D 
expenditures (as a fraction of sales) and whether R&D is performed continuously over time 
(dummy variable). These two variables measure a firm’s absorptive capacity which has been 
found crucial for successful innovation activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Besides, we 
control for other structural features: firm size (number of employees), firm age, location in 
Eastern Germany (dummy), internationalization (exports as a share of sales) and whether the 
firm is a subsidiary of a foreign firm (dummy). Finally, we add five dummy variables 
controlling for industry effects: medium-high tech manufacturing, high tech manufacturing, 
distributive services, knowledge intensive services and technological services. Low tech 
manufacturing will serve as the comparison group in all estimations. The detailed industry 
classification can be found in Table 6 in appendix A. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The median firm in our sample has about 80 employees. Because the largest firm has about 
200,000 employees, the average is rather high, at 820 employees (Table 2). In order to control 
for the skewed distribution we use the logarithm of the number of employees in the 
regressions. The average firm is 17 years old. Since the sample is restricted to firms with 
innovation activities, the absorptive capacity variables are higher than the German average. 
Firms spend an average of 6% of their sales on R&D and about 80% of the firms in our 
sample conduct R&D on a continuous basis. Regarding firms’ internationalization, almost a 
quarter of the sales were exports and 9% of the firms have their headquarters abroad. One 
third of the firms are located in Eastern Germany and 30% of the firms are active in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Of the four types of intervention, public procurement seems to be the least important for 
innovation activities. Only 5% of the firms are involved in public procurement contracts 
asked for them or demanded them directly? If yes, from which industry did they come?” In case of academic 
sources: “… were only made possible through new research results by universities or public research 
institutions.” In case of regulation: “… were triggered by new laws or regulations.” 
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which contribute significantly to the firm’s innovation activities, with 1% relating to defense 
procurement and 4% to other procurement. In contrast, domestic universities and research 
institutions are important sources of information for 13% of the firms. 18% implemented 
innovations which were triggered by regulation and laws. The most prevalent of the four types 
of intervention is public funding. One third of the firms receive R&D subsidies. 
On average, about 10% of the sales are generated by market novelties. We also calculate 
this share of sales for four subsamples, consisting of firms which were affected by a specific 
intervention. Firms for which public procurement is an important innovation impulse realize 
18% of their sales with new-to-the-market products. Firms with universities as an important 
information source generate 14% of their sales with market novelties, followed by firms 
which receive public funding (11%). The corresponding share of sales for firms in which 
regulations triggered innovations equals 10%. In the next step the effects of the four types of 
intervention on the innovation success are analyzed in a multivariate context.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (1,149 observations) 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
Share of turnover with market novelties 9.701 18.175 0 100 
 For subsample     
 Innovation source: Public procurement (d) 17.095 26.696 0 100 
 Innovation source: Regulation (d) 10.435 19.469 0 100 
 Innovation source: Domestic university (d)  14.272 20.884 0 100 
 Public funding for innovation (d)  11.733 19.008 0 100 
      
Focus Variables     
Innovation source: Public procurement (d) 0.048 0.214 0 1 
Innovation source: Public procurement Admin (d) 0.037 0.190 0 1 
Innovation source: Public procurement Defense (d) 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Innovation source: Regulation (d) 0.178 0.382 0 1 
Innovation source: Domestic university (d)  0.126 0.332 0 1 
Public R&D subsidy (d)  0.347 0.476 0 1 
     
Control Variables     
Continuous R&D (d)  0.810 0.392 0 1 
R&D expenditure as a share of total sales (ratio)  0.060 0.114 0 0.88 
No. of employees (logs)  4.499 1.815 0 12 
Firm age (years) 17.232 15.317 0 96 
Location Eastern Germany (d)  0.329 0.470 0 1 
Exports as a share of total sales (ratio)  0.238 0.266 0 1 
Headquarters abroad (d)  0.087 0.282 0 1 
Other manuf. (d) 0.320 0.467 0 1 
Medium-high technology manuf. (d)  0.248 0.432 0 1 
High technology manuf. (d) 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Distributive services (d)  0.067 0.250 0 1 
Knowledge-intensive services (d) 0.070 0.255 0 1 
Technological services (d) 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Note:  d: dummy variable 
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No severe collinearity problems between the explanatory variables, which could bias the 
estimation results, are detected (see Table 7 in appendix A). We can be confident that no 
collinearity issues exist because the variance inflation factors of the variables are satisfactory 
(for further description see, e.g., Neter et al., 1990, or Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt, 2007).8 
4.4 Estimation strategy 
Econometric approach 
We choose a reduced form model approach to test our theoretical argumentation. The 
available data structure does not allow us to choose a more extensive structural model which 
would explicitly address the possibility that firm participation in the four policy instruments 
may not be a fully random process. Therefore, we cannot completely rule out a potential 
selection bias. However, we believe that limiting our sample to innovative firms only (firms 
with innovative outputs) mitigates potential biases. 
Tobit regressions 
Our dependent variable is the share of sales with market novelties. While all firms in our 
sample are successful innovators, it cannot be assumed that all of their innovations were not 
just new to the firm but new to the market as a whole. In fact, 45% of the firms do not develop 
and sell market novelties. In order to take this censoring of the dependent variable into 
account, our estimation strategy is based on tobit models.  
Latent class tobit regression 
It is reasonable to assume that the effects of the four interventions are not the same for all 
firms, i.e. we expect them to vary with firm size, age, location, and sector. We suggest that 
subpopulations of firms with distinctive features exist in our dataset and that relationships 
between policy instruments and innovation outputs (market success) differ significantly 
between these subpopulations. While the former issue is traditionally addressed through 
cluster analytical methods, the latter would typically require regression analysis. We rely on 
latent class tobit estimation analysis, which allows us to cover both aspects simultaneously. 
This technique was introduced by Lazarsfeld (1950) for identifying patterns in survey 
responses. Latent classes are unobservable (latent) subgroups or segments. The goal of latent 
class analysis is to identify subgroups of observations that are similar to other subgroup 
members, in terms of predefined variables, but dissimilar to members of other subgroups. In 
this sense, latent class analysis differs from other continuous latent variable approaches (like 
random-effects regression), as the identification of groups (or categories) is the primary goal. 
It therefore follows a finite mixture model rationale, i.e. a dataset is disentangled into a finite 
mixture of distinctly different populations. It is superior to traditional cluster analysis as it is 
based on a statistical model which allows for significance tests and measurements of fit 
(Jensen et al., 2007; for a detailed discussion see Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002). 
 
8  There are different rules-of-thumb regarding the cut-off points when multi-collinearity is a problem. The 
values range between 4 and 10. The highest factor in our study equals 1.27. In addition, the correlation 
matrix of the explaining variables is shown in  in appendix A. Table 8
Latent class analysis can be combined with regression analysis by specifying a set of 
variables (covariates) that influence the conditional probability of a certain observation 
belonging to a certain class, as well as variables that influence the dependent variable 
(predictors). Put simply, the problem of assigning observations to latent classes and obtaining 
separate regression results for each class is solved in one optimization step. Latent class 
regression analysis can therefore be considered more general than traditional regression 
analysis that assumes that all observations are homogeneous. 
The general probability structure is: 
cov cov
1
( , ) ( ) ( ,
K
pred pred
i i i i i i
x
f y x x P z x f y z x
=
= ∑ )
 
where the probability of outcome y (share of sales with market novelties) for observation i 
depends upon the conditional probability of belonging to one of K latent classes (with z as the 
latent variable) based on a vector x of covariate variables (xcov) and a vector x of predictors 
(xpred). We assume that a firm’s exposure to various policy instruments can be condensed into 
a finite number of patterns (latent classes) depending upon size, firm age, location (Eastern 
Germany) and industry (covariates). Besides, we can test at the same time whether differences 
exist between the effects of the various policy instruments (predictors) on market success 
given that firms belong to a certain pattern (i.e. are part of a particular latent class). Again we 
formulate the regression as a tobit model and carry it out using the algorithm provided by 
Vermunt and Magidson (2005). 
5 Results 
Table 3 presents the results of our tobit estimations. We estimate two separate models. 
Model 1 contains all forms of public procurement in a single variable while Model 2 separates 
defense related public procurement (including police and fire department needs) from the rest 
(e.g. public administration, social security agencies). Most importantly, we find that public 
procurement has a positive and significant effect on innovation success (measured as sales 
with new-to-the-market products). A comparison between Models 1 and 2 reveals that this 
positive effect does not stem from defense/security related public procurement but from more 
conventional branches of public procurement, such as purchases for general administrative 
needs. In this sense, we support existing literature on the topic which questions the potential 
of defense procurement to stimulate innovation (Geroski, 1990). 
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Table 3: Tobit models for the share of turnover with market novelties 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Focus Variables   
Innovation Source: Public procurement (d) 9.44** 
(4.17) 
 
Innovation Source: Public procurement Admin (d)  7.93* 
(4.72) 
Innovation Source: Public procurement Defense (d)  11.09 
(8.22) 
Innovation Source: Regulation (d) -0.89 
(2.43) 
-0.90 
(2.43) 
Innovation Source: Domestic university (d)  5.27* 
(2.77) 
5.32* 
(2.77) 
Public R&D subsidy (d)  1.04 
(2.08) 
1.04 
(2.08) 
Control Variables   
Continuous R&D (d)  4.86* 
(2.53) 
4.94* 
(2.53) 
R&D expenditure as a share of total sales (ratio)  33.16*** 
(8.71) 
32.82*** 
(8.74) 
No. of employees (logs)  -0.18 
(0.58) 
-0.19 
(0.58) 
Firm age (years) -0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.25*** 
(0.07) 
Location Eastern Germany (d)  -5.28** 
(2.10) 
-5.28** 
(2.10) 
Exports as a share of total sales (ratio)  2.59 
(3.91) 
2.51 
(3.91) 
Headquarters abroad (d)  1.13 
(3.20) 
1.04 
(3.22) 
Medium-high technology manuf. (d)  4.26* 
(2.46) 
4.33* 
(2.46) 
High technology manuf. (d) 6.64** 
(2.93) 
6.61** 
(2.94) 
Distributive services (d)  -2.35 
(4.07) 
-2.23 
(4.07) 
Knowledge-intensive services (d) 2.41 
(3.87) 
2.52 
(3.87) 
Technological services (d) 0.42 
(3.09) 
0.51 
(3.08) 
Constant -4.09 
(3.77) 
-4.08 
(3.78) 
Wald χ2 82.23 81.77 
P-value  0.00 0.00 
Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 
No. of obs. 1,149 1,149 
Notes:  *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Wald χ2 displays the Wald test statistic for 
the joint significance of the explanatory variables. The next line reports the corresponding p-value. 
Coefficients are shown (standard errors in parenthesis).  
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A major goal of this study is to compare the innovation effects of public procurement with 
other forms of public support. Our results suggest that only knowledge spillovers from 
universities have equally strong positive effects on market success with innovation products 
as public procurement. At first glance the impact of public procurement appears to be much 
stronger, but additional t-tests show that this difference between the two coefficients is not 
statistically significant. Neither regulation nor public funding for innovation projects seems to 
have a significant impact on market success. In the case of regulation this may be related to 
the way in which we capture innovation success. We are focusing on the sales of products 
which are not just new to the firm but also new to the whole market. A mandatory, market 
wide regulatory standard may set the bar for all firms equally and limit opportunities for 
differentiation. Public co-funding of innovation projects, though, may be more closely related 
to building basic innovation assets for the future instead of fostering immediate market 
success. 
Coefficients of control variables remain stable in both models. We develop no a priori 
hypotheses on their relationships with market success but major findings will be discussed 
briefly. Not surprisingly, investments in R&D activities (as a share of sales) as well as 
engaging in them continuously (often associated with having a dedicated R&D department) 
are positively and significantly associated with innovation success. Firm age seems to be 
more closely related to innovation success than firm size, as younger firms are more likely to 
generate larger portions of their sales with market novelties. Besides, firms in the 
economically challenged Eastern part of Germany have significantly smaller shares of sales 
with market novelties. Finally, firms from medium-high (e.g. automotives) as well as high 
tech manufacturing sectors (e.g. medical instruments) have significantly higher shares. 
The previous estimations modeled additive relationships between various forms of public 
support for innovation (e.g. public procurement) and several structural features (e.g. firm size, 
age, industry). We estimate additional latent class tobit models to investigate whether the 
effects of these forms of public intervention differ, given certain structural features. Latent 
class tobit estimation allows us to model homogeneous subgroups of firms based on their size, 
age, location (East/West Germany) and industry. At the same time, it enables us to model the 
relationship between different forms of public support and innovation success within these 
subgroups. 
Identifying the correct number of clusters or classes is challenging with traditional cluster 
analysis techniques (e.g. K-Means). Each additional cluster provides a better fitting solution 
(in its extreme form, each observation would be in its own class) but too many classes make it 
hard to identify and interpret meaningful structures. Hence, a parsimonious solution is 
required. Latent class cluster analysis rests upon a formal statistical model and therefore 
provides quantitative indicators for choosing a fitting number of clusters. This decision is 
typically based upon two key figures: the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) and the Akaike 
information criteria (AIC). Both compare the exploratory power of a model with one 
additional cluster to the number of parameters required to estimate it. Hence, these criteria 
should be minimized to indicate an appropriate number of classes. Andrews and Currim 
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(2003) compare a number of criteria and find AIC39 to be the most appropriate. We follow 
their advice and retain a two class solution. Each class covers roughly half of all firm 
observations. Table 4 provides statistical details as well as probabilities for class membership. 
We will present class assignments and performance relationships (see Table 5) separately for 
clarity and convenience in interpretation. However, it should be kept in mind that both 
estimations are performed simultaneously. 
Table 4: Class profiles 
Covariates Base Class Focus Class Wald p-value 
No. of employees (logs)  0.12 -0.12 10.23 0.00 
Firm age (years) 0.00 0.00 1.06 0.30 
Location Eastern Germany (d)  -0.33 0.33 6.51 0.01 
Medium-high technology manuf. (d)  0.16 -0.16 1.09 0.30 
High technology manuf. (d) -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.93 
Distributive services (d)  -0.60 0.60 3.06 0.08 
Knowledge-intensive services (d) -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.88 
Technological services (d) -0.37 0.37 3.85 0.05 
Constant -0.29 0.29 1.85 0.17 
Class size (in %) 51 49  
Model Selection    
BIC(LL) 
AIC3(LL)  
1-Cluster: 6,639.34; 2-Cluster: 6,422.36; 3-Cluster: 6,508.85; 4-Cluster: 6,600.95 
1-Cluster: 6,598.87; 2-Cluster: 6,305.01; 3-Cluster: 6,314.61; 4-Cluster: 6,329.82 
 
Table 4 provides probabilities of class membership. We conduct Wald tests on significant 
effects (last column of Table 4). Hence, firm size, location in Eastern Germany and operating 
in distributive as well as technological services influence class assignments significantly. We 
find that smaller firms in Eastern Germany from distributive (e.g. transportation) as well as 
technological services (e.g. software development) characterize class 2, which we will 
subsequently refer to as the “focus class.” Firms without these characteristics are more likely 
to end up in the slightly larger “base class” 1. Table 5 shows the results of the simultaneous 
performance tobit estimations in each class. 
Table 5: Latent class tobit models for the share of turnover with market novelties  
 Coefficient Wald p-value Wald (=) p-value 
 Base 
Class 
Focus 
Class 
    
Innovation Source: Public procurement (d) -3.330 29.100 7.070 0.03 7.000 0.01 
Innovation Source: Regulation (d) -0.401 -3.003 0.383 0.83 0.108 0.74 
Innovation Source: Domestic university (d)  3.641 7.604 8.726 0.01 0.216 0.64 
Public R&D subsidy (d)  1.081 -0.003 0.979 0.61 0.026 0.87 
Continuous R&D (d)  0.443 12.740 3.562 0.17 2.056 0.15 
R&D exp. as a share of total sales (ratio)  29.917 46.136 36.639 0.00 0.621 0.43 
Exports as a share of total sales (ratio)  -0.549 17.348 2.141 0.34 1.936 0.16 
Headquarters abroad (d)  -0.520 7.528 0.450 0.80 0.450 0.50 
Constant 1.849 -33.007 16.171 0.00 13.955 0.00 
R2 0.159 0.051     
No. of obs. 589 560     
Note:  *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%); Public procurement in this estimation 
contains both administrative as well as defense related aspects. 
                                                 
9  AIC3 = LogLikelihood – 3 degrees of freedom 
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We conduct Wald tests on whether a variable has a significant impact on the model as a 
whole (column “Wald”) and whether these effects differ significantly between classes 
(column “Wald (=)”). Generally, we find that these results support the focus variable results 
from the initial tobit estimations. Public procurement and knowledge spillovers from 
universities have a significant impact on innovation success (sales with new-to-market 
products). The effect of university inputs is consistently positive across both classes. 
However, the effects of public procurement differ significantly between them. The effect is 
slightly negative for the base class and very positive for the focus class. Hence, we conclude 
that public procurement is not generally beneficial to all firms but most effective when 
directed at smaller firms in economically challenged regional markets (Eastern Germany) in 
both distributive and technological services. 
One issue in the econometric analysis could be that firms do not participate or are not 
affected randomly by the specific policy instruments. As a consequence the results might be 
biased due to differences between participants and non-participants in important 
characteristics. In order to check the robustness of the effects we control for a potential 
selection by applying a nonparametric matching procedure (cf. Heckman et al. 1999). We 
conduct two matching estimations for the significant policy variables from the previous tobit 
estimation models: public procurement and university knowledge spillovers. The main results 
are confirmed by this approach (see appendix B for a short description of the approach and 
the corresponding results). 
6 Conclusions 
We conduct this study to analyze the effects of public technology procurement, a recently 
revitalized innovation policy tool, on firms’ innovation success. We judge the effects of this 
instrument against other forms of public support, namely regulation, provision of 
infrastructure via universities and research institutions, and public R&D subsidies. Our goal is 
to support policy makers with empirical evidence on two major research questions: Is public 
procurement an effective instrument to provide public support for innovation compared to 
other options and if so, for which firms does it work? 
In a first step we compare the effects of the instruments on innovation success, measured as 
the share of turnover with market novelties. Then we investigate whether the effects of these 
forms are specific to certain structural features of firms. We find that public policy leverage 
points are neither limited to the supply nor the demand side. Public procurement has 
significant positive effects on innovation success but so does the provision of a knowledge 
infrastructure in universities spilling over to firms. Both effects have similar impacts on 
innovation success. Interestingly, the positive effects from public procurement stem from 
general administrative procurement and not from the needs of the military, police or fire 
departments. 
However, the effects of each policy instrument may depend upon firm characteristics. In the 
second step of the analysis we question whether firms are fully homogenous in their response 
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to certain forms of public support. Applying latent class tobit models we identify two 
subgroups of firms which are homogeneous in terms of their structural characteristics such as 
size, location (Eastern Germany) and industry. We discover that firms benefit equally from 
university knowledge across these firm subgroups. Thus, a policy of trying to generate 
knowledge spillovers from universities to firms could target all sectors and types of firms. In 
order to strengthen linkages between firms and universities and research institutions either 
firms can be encouraged to use universities’ knowledge or universities can be given incentives 
to diffuse their knowledge and technologies more intensively (technology transfer). 
We find that public procurement has heterogeneous effects on firm’s innovation 
performance. It is effective in particular for smaller firms in regional areas under economic 
stress and in distributive and technological services. We suspect that public procurement may 
be especially promising for firms with limited resources. The fact that orders are typically 
large and come from reliable public entities provides these firms with the necessary planning 
reliability to engage in innovation activities which may otherwise be to expensive or risky. 
Besides, public procurement provides them with immediate sales opportunities, as opposed to 
support for research, which requires additional investments for exploitation in the future. Our 
results offer empirical evidence to support Geroski’s suggestion “of supporting a wide range 
of small- and medium-size contractors capable of handling smaller projects” (Geroski, 1990: 
196). Obviously, there are limits on how public procurement tenders can be tailored to 
specific firm characteristics. Then again, our results indicate that they have the greatest 
immediate impact on innovation outputs if small firms – especially in economically 
challenged regions – are aware of them and can participate in a way that suits their limited 
resources. This seems to be especially relevant when it comes to the public procurement of 
distributive and technological services. 
We benefit from an extensive dataset of German firms and coverage of several important 
innovation policy instruments. However, the limitations of this study may provide fruitful 
paths for further research. One constraint of our analysis is that we cannot assess the 
efficiency of the different instruments, since we do not have information regarding the 
quantitative input provided by the government. We can only examine whether the 
interventions are adequate in general to accomplish a certain objective, namely the 
contribution to firms’ innovation success. Furthermore, the study is static in nature. It would 
be helpful to have panel data in order to reveal effects of the interventions over longer periods 
of time. In addition, our results are limited to the German context. Comparative studies with 
other countries could provide valuable new insights. 
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Appendix A 
Table 6: Industry classification 
Industry NACE Code Industry Group 
Mining and quarrying 10 – 14 Other manufacturing 
Food and tobacco 15 – 16 Other manufacturing 
Textiles  and leather 17 – 19 Other manufacturing 
Wood / paper / publishing 20 – 22 Other manufacturing 
Chemicals / petroleum  23 – 24 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Plastic / rubber  25 Other manufacturing 
Glass / ceramics  26 Other manufacturing 
Metal  27 – 28 Other manufacturing 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of electrical machinery 30 – 32 High-tech manufacturing 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 High-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 – 35 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, sports 
equipment and toys 
36 – 37 Other manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 40 – 41 Other manufacturing 
Construction 45 Other manufacturing 
Retail and motor trade 50, 52 Distributive services 
Wholesale trade 51 Distributive services 
Transportation and communication 60 – 63, 64.1 Distributive services 
Financial intermediation 65 – 67 Knowledge-intensive services 
Real estate and renting 70 – 71 Distributive services 
ICT services 72, 64.2 Technological services 
Technical services 73, 74.2, 74.3 Technological services 
Consulting 74.1, 74.4 Knowledge-intensive services 
Other business-oriented services 74.5 – 74.8, 90 Distributive services 
Table 7: Variance inflation factors 
Variable VIF 
Focus Variables  
Innovation Source: Public procurement (d) 1.07 
Innovation Source: Regulation (d) 1.11 
Innovation Source: Domestic university (d)  1.17 
Public R&D subsidy (d)  1.28 
Control Variables  
Continuous R&D (d)  1.19 
R&D expenditure as a share of total sales (ratio)  1.35 
No. of employees (logs)  1.43 
Firm age (years) 1.23 
Location Eastern Germany (d)  1.23 
Exports as a share of total sales (ratio)  1.42 
Headquarters abroad (d)  1.07 
Medium-high technology manufacturing (d)  1.45 
High technology manufacturing (d) 1.33 
Distributive services (d)  1.18 
Knowledge-intensive services (d) 1.23 
Technological services (d) 1.63 
Mean 1.27 
 
Table 8: Correlation table (1,149 observations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Innovation Source: Public procurement (1) 1.00  
Innovation Source: Regulation (2) 0.16 1.00  
Innovation Source: Domestic university (3) 0.14 0.19 1.00  
Public R&D subsidy (4) 0.07 0.10 0.27 1.00  
Cont. R&D activities (5) 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.23 1.00  
Public R&D funding (6) 0.01 0.08 0.21 0.31 0.21 1.00  
No of employees (7) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.27 1.00  
Company age (8) 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.34 1.00 
Location in East Germany (9) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.17 0.25 0.30 1.00
Export share of sales (10) 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.32 0.18 0.20 1.00
Headquarters abroad (11) 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.17 1.00
Medium-high technology manufacturing (12) 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.32 0.09 1.00
High technology manufacturing (13) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.04 -0.23 1.00
Distributive services (14) 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11 1.00
Knowledge-intensive services (15) 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.22 0.00 -0.16 -0.11 -0.07 1.00
Technological services (16) 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.18 0.03 0.30 0.31 0.19 0.05 -0.22 -0.09 -0.25 -0.17 -0.12 -0.12 1.00
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The matching approach is commonly used in the analysis of public R&D subsidies where a 
selection problem arises (see, e.g., Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002 or Duguet, 2004). In order to 
check the robustness of the found effects we control for a potential selection by applying the 
matching procedure. We conduct two matching estimations for the significant policy variables 
from the previous tobit estimation models: public procurement and university knowledge 
spillovers. The respective policy instrument is called treatment. The outcome variable in our 
setting is the share of turnover with market novelties. The basic idea of the matching approach 
is to balance the sample of participants with comparable non-participants individually for 
each observation with respect to the variables included in the matching procedure. The 
remaining differences in the outcome variable between both groups are then attributed to the 
treatment (Heckman et al. 1997).  
In order to identify the average treatment effect (ATT) two assumptions have to hold: the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) and common support. The CIA implies that all 
the characteristics which influence both treatment and outcome have to be observed. Common 
support requires that for each treated observation a similar control can be found. Given the 
broad range of variables in our dataset we are confident that we have enough information on 
the firms to sufficiently approximate the treatment and the outcome so that the CIA holds. To 
ensure that common support for the treated firms is fulfilled in the matching procedure, only 
one treated observation has to be dropped. 
Before proceeding to the actual matching, two probit models were estimated on the 
probabilities of having public procurement and universities as important information sources 
(for a detailed description of the matching procedure see, e.g., Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002). The 
results of the two probit estimations can be found in Table 9. The propensity score of this 
estimation is labeled PSCORE. In order to find a control observation for each treated firm, the 
nearest neighbor approach with replacement, based on the Mahalanobis distance is applied. 
Besides PSCORE the Mahalanobis metric restriction is defined by the other three policy 
interventions – to ensure that treated and control firms are affected by the same policy 
interventions –, industry group dummies, and the location (Eastern Germany).  
Table 10 illustrates the differences for the considered characteristics and the outcome 
variables after the two matching procedures between the treated and control groups: firms 
with public procurement and universities as important sources, as the treatment group, 
respectively, and firms without the intervention as the control group. The matching estimator 
is successful in balancing out the differences for the considered variables between the treated 
and the control group as shown by the t-Tests. Hence, it is possible to estimate the causal 
effect of the treatment on the firms. In order to evaluate the quality of the matching we re-
estimate the propensity score by using only the matched sample and taking account of 
replacement in the control group by weighting. As stated by Sianesi (2004) the pseudo-R2 
after matching should be quite low because there should be no more systematic differences in 
the regressors between treated and control companies. In our setting, the Pseudo-R2 after the 
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re-estimation is fairly low. Furthermore, a likelihood ratio suggests that there is no joint 
significance of all covariates of the probit model after matching in both estimations. 
Comparing the outcome variable for the two groups it can be seen that the variable is 
significantly larger for the treated groups – firms with public procurement and universities, – 
compared to the respective control groups. We find that both public procurement and 
university spillovers have a significantly positive influence on the success with innovation. 
Thus, the main results are confirmed by this approach. 
Table 9: Probit estimation results  
 Innovation Source: 
Public procurement 
Innovation Source: 
Domestic university 
Innovation Source: Public procurement (d)  0.51*** 
(0.19) 
Innovation Source: Regulation (d) 0.57*** 
(0.15) 
0.51*** 
(0.12) 
Innovation Source: Domestic university (d)  0.42** 
(0.18) 
 
Public R&D subsidy (d)  0.18 
(0.16) 
0.70*** 
(0.11) 
Continuous R&D (d)  0.29 
(0.20) 
0.42** 
(0.20) 
R&D expenditure as a share of total sales (ratio)  -1.86** 
(0.81) 
0.90** 
(0.44) 
No. of employees (logs)  0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Firm age (years) -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Location Eastern Germany (d)  0.20 
(0.17) 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
Exports as a share of total sales (ratio)  -0.62 
(0.39) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
Headquarters abroad (d)  0.16 
(0.22) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
Medium-high technology manuf. (d)  0.08 
(0.23) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
High technology manuf. (d) 0.47** 
(0.23) 
0.26 
(0.17) 
Distributive services (d)  0.51* 
(0.27) 
-0.74 
(0.46) 
Knowledge-intensive services (d) 0.46* 
(0.27) 
0.40* 
(0.23) 
Technological services (d) 0.67*** 
(0.22) 
0.55*** 
(0.17) 
Constant -2.51*** 
(0.31) 
-2.31*** 
(0.30) 
Wald χ2 81.86 128.49 
P-value  0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.19 
No. of obs. 1,149 1,149 
Notes:  *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Wald χ2 displays the Wald test statistic for 
the joint significance of the explanatory variables. The next line reports the corresponding p-value. 
Coefficients are shown (standard errors in parenthesis).  
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Table 10: Results after matching  
Treatment Innovation Source:  
Public procurement 
 Innovation Source:  
Domestic university 
 Mean p-value   Mean p-value 
 Treated Control of t-test  Treated Control of t-test 
PSCORE 0.113 0.106 0.716  0.265 0.263 0.943 
Inno. Source: Public procurement (d) 1 0   0.124 0.124 1.000 
Inno. Source: Regulation (d) 0.444 0.444 1.000  0.372 0.372 1.000 
Inno. Source: Domestic university (d)  0.315 0.315 1.000  1 0  
Public R&D subsidy (d)  0.481 0.481 1.000  0.690 0.690 1.000 
Continuous R&D (d)  0.870 0.796 0.306  0.952 0.952 1.000 
R&D exp. as a share of total sales (ratio)  0.057 0.050 0.741  0.125 0.118 0.724 
No. of employees (logs)  4.427 4.166 0.527  4.326 3.997 0.152 
Firm age (years) 14.778 12.926 0.533  15.297 14.407 0.632 
Location Eastern Germany (d)  0.407 0.444 0.700  0.359 0.393 0.546 
Exports as a share of total sales (ratio)  0.134 0.144 0.815  0.235 0.263 0.404 
Headquarters abroad (d)  0.111 0.037 0.144  0.090 0.069 0.516 
Medium-high technology manuf. (d)  0.148 0.222 0.326  0.241 0.262 0.686 
High technology manuf. (d) 0.167 0.148 0.794  0.172 0.172 1.000 
Distributive services (d)  0.093 0.037 0.245  0.007 0.007 1.000 
Knowledge-intensive services (d) 0.111 0.167 0.409  0.076 0.041 0.213 
Technological services (d) 0.333 0.315 0.839  0.345 0.386 0.466 
Share of turnover with market noveltiesa) 15.559 7.111 0.030  14.272 10.103 0.089 
No. of matched pairs 54  145 
a)  T-test is based on bootstrapped standard errors of the estimates; no. of replications: 100. 
